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Abstract: This paper investigates the relationship between board human capital and enterprise 
growth. By analysing data from Chinese publicly listed companies between 2008 and 2017, we 
apply resource-based theory and endogenous growth theory to develop a model, and we show 
board human capital has positive effects on enterprise growth and ambidextrous innovation 
mediates between them. We further consider the role of industry differences and market 
competition and show empirical evidence that board human capital has a favorable impact on 
enterprise growth, and such an effect is more prominent in the high-tech industry. In addition, our 
results suggest that ambidextrous innovation plays a partial intermediary role between board 
human capital and enterprise growth. Such a favorable effect is prominent in the high-tech 
industry but is not affected by market competition. Furthermore, the promotion of exploratory 
innovation is not affected by the nature of the industry, but the promotion effect is more 
pronounced when the market competition is weak. We finally discuss the implications of the 
findings for scholars, managers, and policymakers alike. 
Keywords: enterprise growth; board human capital; ambidextrous innovation; industry 
differences; market competition 
 
1. Introduction 
Enterprise growth is one of the main driving forces for sustainable economic development and 
an important indicator for measuring the operating status and development prospects of listed 
enterprises [1]. Currently, China's economy is shifting from a high-speed growth to a high-quality 
development stage, which is composed of transforming the pattern of development, optimizing the 
economic structure, and transforming growth drivers. Therefore, how to transform the economic 
growth mode and to achieve sustainable and stable development has become one of the key issues in 
the process of survival and development for many enterprises. However, the factors affecting 
enterprise growth are too complicated. The research on the long-term mechanism of enterprises is 
not mature yet, and the related research on the growth of enterprises has not yet formed a unified 
theoretical system. As an organizational phenomenon, enterprise growth is determined by the 
strategic decisions made and implemented by managers when interacting with firm resources [2]. 
Although some scholars have proposed the theoretical research framework of “enterprise 
resources—enterprise capabilities—enterprise growth,” it has not yet revealed in depth how the 
internal special resources or core competencies of enterprises play a role as the “original motive 
force” for enterprise growth [3]. Therefore, combined with the domestic and international situation, 
how to improve the core competitiveness and crack the “black box problem” of the long-term 
growth mechanism of enterprises is still the top priority of corporate governance research at present.  
Undoubtedly, the construction of the core competence of enterprises cannot be separated from 
adequate resources that guarantee effective strategic decision-making. The management is the 
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distributor of enterprise core resources and the decision-maker of the strategic plan, who ultimately 
makes, influences, and is responsible for the key resources related to new products and technology 
investment [4]. Agency theory suggests that once the management has self-seeking behavior, it may 
damage the rights and interests of shareholders and harm the sustainable development of 
enterprises. Hence, the corporate governance mechanism comes into being, especially the existence 
of the board of directors. The board of directors is the core institution of corporate governance [5], 
which is responsible for providing resources and consulting, in addition to acting as the shareholder 
trustee. Therefore, the board of directors plays an irreplaceable role in implementing management 
monitoring, reducing agency costs, and other aspects of corporate governance. However, the board 
of directors can only weaken the agency problem to a certain extent, and the degree of weakening is 
affected by its human capital and social capital [6]. Previous studies have been mainly based on the 
principal–agent theory and the resource dependence theory from the perspective of the supervision 
function and resource function of the board of directors, respectively [7,8]. They confirmed the 
importance of board capital for enterprise growth, but ignored the positive role of board capital in 
building the core competitiveness. According to the resource dependence theory, an effective board 
of directors should contain sufficient human capital and social capital, which together constitute 
board capital, and can measure the ability of the board to provide resources for enterprises [9]. 
According to the resource-based theory, heterogeneous resources owned by enterprises determine 
the difference in the competitiveness of enterprises, and it is believed that only valuable, rare, 
incompletely mimetic, and irreplaceable resources can generate sustainable competitive advantages 
[10]. Indeed, board capital is the heterogeneous resource of an enterprise.  
Innovation is the key to building the core competitiveness of enterprises. However, enterprises 
are constantly faced with a dilemma in the process of pursuing innovation. From the perspective of 
organizational innovation capabilities, if enterprises are too keen to pursue their core competencies 
and cannot adapt to the rapidly changing market environment, this will easily lead to “core 
rigidities” and “competency traps.” Similarly, if enterprises overemphasize technology research and 
development and neglect market demand and technological transformation, they will easily fall into 
the “innovation trap” [11,12]. This requires enterprises to attach importance to two kinds of 
innovations. On the one hand, exploitative innovation can enhance the utilization rate of existing 
knowledge, capabilities, and skills, and stabilize the market position and earnings by continuing the 
existing business model. On the other hand, exploratory innovation continuously breaks through 
existing technology in order to adapt to future changes in the market demand and competitive 
environment [13]. In other words, enterprises should pursue both exploitative innovation and 
exploratory innovation, namely ambidextrous innovation. In fact, whether we recognize the essence 
of innovation or attach importance to innovation depends largely on the level of board human 
capital. The existing literature has only examined the relationship between board human capital and 
the level of enterprise innovation. As for the relationship between board human capital and 
ambidextrous innovation, the literature neither elaborates the logical and rigorous theory under the 
normative management analysis framework nor offers rigorous and detailed empirical analysis. 
Therefore, it is difficult to reveal the entangled relationship between board human capital and the 
construction of the competitive advantage of enterprises.  
In this paper, we explore the route of board human capital that influences enterprise growth, 
introduce ambidextrous innovation as the intermediary variable, and explore the differences in the 
factors affecting enterprise growth and ambidextrous innovation. We find that board human capital 
significantly and positively affects enterprise growth, in which ambidextrous innovation plays the 
part of a mediating role, and its balance effect can significantly enhance enterprise growth to a 
certain extent. Board human capital plays a more significant role in promoting enterprise growth in 
the high-tech industry, while its role in promoting ambidextrous innovation is affected by the nature 
of the industry and market competition. Specifically, the promotion of exploitative innovation is 
more significant in the high-tech industry, but not affected by market competition, and the 
promotion effect on exploratory innovation is not affected by the nature of the industry, but it is 
more significant when the market competition is weak. In addition, we show significant industry 
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differences in the role of ambidextrous innovation in promoting enterprise growth. Among them, 
the promotion effect of exploitative innovation is more significant in non-high-tech industries, while 
the promotion effect of exploratory innovation is more significant in high-tech industries. 
2. The Analysis of the Mechanism of Board Human Capital Affecting Enterprise Growth 
2.1. Board Human Capital and Enterprise Growth 
The board of directors plays a vital role in the linkage between enterprises and social resources, 
fulfilling its role of supervision and resource provision. Board human capital is the general term for the 
speciality, experience, knowledge, skills, and abilities of board members [8]. As a special resource 
within enterprises, human capital enhances the ability of directors to identify and utilize business 
opportunities or supervise and manage behaviors [14], affecting the acquisition of enterprise 
resources, strategic decision-making, and management operations [15]. Listed companies are 
increasingly favoring candidates with high academic qualifications, specific job experience, and 
overseas background when recruiting, and has even become a hard requirement for recruiting 
management, which provides an important source of indicators for the study of board human capital. 
Previous studies have used the board’s education level, board’s professional background [9], and 
board’s overseas experience [16] to measure board human capital and studied its impact on innovation 
investment and corporate performance. 
To a certain extent, education level reflects the knowledge reserve and professionalization of 
directors, and affects their thinking mode and ability for information processing, which is of great 
significance to corporate governance and corporate performance. The education level of directors has 
an important influence on the strategic preference of enterprises [16]. This is because the formulation 
of a corporate strategy needs a long-term awareness and overall situation consciousness. The 
generation of strategic thinking is restricted and influenced by the level of theory and knowledge. The 
more education the directors have, the more reasonable their strategic thinking is. It is more conducive 
to the formulation of corporate growth strategies. Furthermore, directors with a higher education level 
would have a stronger ability to obtain and utilize information [8]. They can objectively evaluate the 
risks and benefits of R&D investment by analyzing and examining the net present value of existing 
projects for the enterprises. They also have a deeper understanding of the planned or current R&D 
investment projects and prevent the loss of opportunities or engage in excessive investment. 
Therefore, the higher a board’s education level, the better the enterprise growth.     
At present, overseas experience, such as overseas educational experience or overseas work 
experience, has become an important way to introduce intelligence. A board’s overseas experience 
helps them to receive a good education and to accumulate advanced management experience, making 
their thinking mode and management concepts more international and market-oriented [17]. Returnee 
directors usually have a deeper understanding of the international market, overcome the 
psychological distance of overseas business expansion, make appropriate overseas business decisions 
[18], and improve the investment efficiency of enterprises [19]. Furthermore, the returnee directors are 
more capable of addressing the challenges, difficulties, and complexities associated with 
internationalization [20], and enable enterprises to respond more flexibly and actively to the changes 
in the international markets, and help to introduce advanced management experience and production 
technology to promote the development of overseas markets and mergers and acquisitions [21]. It is 
extremely important to attract excellent talent at home and abroad to promote enterprise growth. 
Given this evidence, we hypothesize the following: 
H1. Board human capital has a favorable effect on enterprise growth. 
H1a. The higher the average educational level of directors is, the better the growth of enterprises will be. 
H1b. The larger the proportion of directors with an output function background is, the more favorable it is 
toward improving the growth of enterprises. 
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H1c. The larger the proportion of directors with overseas experience is, the more conducive it is to the growth 
of enterprises. 
2.2. The Relationship between Board Human Capital and Ambidextrous Innovation 
Ambidextrous innovation includes exploitative innovation and exploratory innovation, among 
which, exploitative innovation focuses on the optimization and improvement of products, which is a 
small-scale and gradual innovation behavior; meanwhile, exploratory innovation focuses on seeking 
new possibilities, which is a large-scale and breakthrough innovation [22]. 
Directors with a higher education level have abundant knowledge reserves and excellent 
information-processing capabilities, guiding enterprises to enhance their innovation intensity to cope 
with the challenges of rapid changes in the external environment [23,24]. The existing research shows 
that enterprises with strong human capital can deeply explore the existing knowledge of enterprises 
and improve the efficiency of progressive innovation [25]. Well-educated directors have strong 
knowledge refining, integration, and improvement capabilities, thus providing practical and effective 
solutions for product optimization and improvement. In addition, they are also good at making 
high-level innovative decisions with professional knowledge [26] and help enterprises make creative 
breakthroughs. Highly educated decision-makers have strong information exploration and processing 
capabilities [27], and make more favorable decisions when enterprises face highly uncertain 
innovation decisions. Moreover, they pay more attention to research and development activities, and 
identify innovation opportunities to provide opportunities for enterprises. 
The background of the “output function”, such as marketing, product research, and design, is 
positively related to the choice of enterprise innovation strategy [28]. Directors with a background in 
“output function” have a deeper understanding of future product development, which will have a 
positive impact on technical performance [29]. Accumulated work experiences enable them to have a 
deeper understanding of the market positioning of products and customer needs, and to better 
perform their consulting functions. In particular, they can provide reasonable suggestions for the 
optimization and improvement of products, which is conducive to the improvement of the level and 
ability of enterprise innovation. Furthermore, directors with a background in “output function” have a 
more comprehensive understanding of the innovation process, such that they can predict and deal 
with potential uncertainties in innovation activities and reduce the risk of an enterprise innovation 
investment. Therefore, they are more inclined to increase the research and development investment, 
and promote the breakthrough development of an enterprise technology. It is beneficial for enterprises 
to carry out exploratory innovation activities. However, some studies have shown that higher levels of 
external R&D experience of directors do not significantly affect an enterprise’s technical performance 
[30]. 
A board’s overseas experience is conducive to improving the level and ability of exploitative 
innovation and exploratory innovation of enterprises. On the one hand, returnee executives are 
generally in close contact with relevant overseas research institutions or enterprises [31], have the 
opportunity to access the advanced technical knowledge of developed countries, and apply them to 
the practice of Chinese enterprises. It is beneficial to promote the progress of technology and 
management capabilities of the industry as a whole. Furthermore, from the perspective of integrated 
resources and knowledge base, the external resources and knowledge brought by the management’s 
overseas experience can help enterprises identify new opportunities, and develop new products and 
new markets. It is beneficial for enterprises to establish competitive advantages in emerging markets, 
and to promote technological innovation [32]. These arguments point to the following hypotheses: 
H2. Board human capital promotes exploitative innovation. 
H2a. The average educational level of directors has a favorable effect on exploitative innovation. 
H2b. The proportion of directors with an output function background has a favorable effect on exploitative 
innovation. 
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H2c. The proportion of directors with overseas experience has a favorable effect on exploitative innovation. 
H3. Board human capital promotes exploratory innovation. 
H3a. The average educational level of directors has a favorable effect on exploratory innovation. 
H3b. The proportion of directors with output function background has a favorable effect on exploratory 
innovation. 
H3c. The proportion of directors with overseas experience has a favorable effect on exploratory innovation. 
2.3. The Relationship between Ambidextrous Innovation and Enterprise Growth 
Exploitative innovation and exploratory innovation can improve enterprise growth in different 
ways. Enterprises are faced with the pressure of insufficient utilization of resources and “iterative 
optimization” in the process of growth. Exploitative innovation can improve and optimize the existing 
technical ability through the extraction and integration of existing knowledge [33,34], and can 
continuously improve the utilization and conversion rate of enterprise resources. Furthermore, it can 
meet the refined requirements of the products by improving and optimizing all aspects of the 
production, sales, and operation of enterprises, and provide better service and more abundant value 
transmission for the market demanders [35], so as to stabilize the current revenue and strengthen the 
market position of products [36]. Furthermore, enterprises are faced with insufficient core 
competitiveness and industry competition pressure in the process of growth. Exploratory innovation 
can capture the industry's right to speak by acquiring and creating new knowledge and technology 
[34]. It breaks through the constraints of corporate development, and helps to develop innovative 
products or services, effectively improving the core competitiveness of enterprises [37]. It constantly 
weakens the competitive pressure of the industry, and ultimately creates the overall technological 
breakthrough and linkage development of the industry, bringing excess profits to the enterprise [36]. 
Therefore, exploitative innovation and exploratory innovation have a positive significance in 
improving the short-term financial performance and in building the sustainable competitive 
advantage of enterprises. Given this evidence, we hypothesize the following: 
H4a. Exploitative innovation promotes enterprise growth. 
H4b. Exploratory innovation promotes enterprise growth. 
The existing research suggests that the ambidextrous innovation theory should include the 
balance dimension and the complementary dimension, which are used to measure the balance and 
complementarity of exploitative innovation and exploratory innovation, respectively. Balance means 
that enterprises can maintain a balanced development of two kinds of innovation activities, and do not 
rely too much on a particular type of innovation. Complementarity refers to the fact that two kinds of 
innovation activities in an enterprise can promote and complement each other [38]. Specifically, 
balance between them can help enterprises reduce the risk of “core rigidity” or the “innovation trap” 
generated by one party, reduce the business risk of enterprises, and consider the short-term economic 
benefits and future economic growth of enterprises. When both of them are strong, the 
complementarity between them will appear, and their multiplier effect can significantly improve the 
enterprise’s performance [35]. This is because when an enterprise has a strong level of, and capability 
for, exploitative innovation, it can deepen the application and understanding of exploratory 
innovation knowledge and technology so as to constantly improve and optimize the output of 
exploratory innovation. Similarly, when an enterprise has a strong level and ability of exploratory 
innovation, it can break through the problem of “iterative optimization” in the later stage of 
exploitative innovation and consolidate the competitive position in the market by realizing the 
breakthrough development of products or technologies. It can be seen that both exploitative 
innovation and exploratory innovation can coexist in an enterprise, and when their absolute value is 
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smaller (more balanced) and the product is larger (the more complementary), the promotion of 
enterprise performance is more significant [39]. Given this evidence, we hypothesize the following: 
H5a. The balance effect between exploitative innovation and exploratory innovation promotes enterprise growth. 
H5b. The product effect of exploitative innovation and exploratory innovation promotes enterprise growth. 
2.4. The Mediating Effect of Ambidextrous Innovation 
The theory of the endogenous growth of enterprises suggests that the driving force for enterprise 
growth lies in the internal environment of enterprises. The internal resources, technologies, and 
structures of enterprises are indispensable key elements for enterprise growth. Enterprises can actively 
adjust these elements to improve their growth capacity. The higher a board’s education level is, the 
stronger their understanding and application ability of knowledge will be. In addition to enhancing 
the knowledge reserve of enterprises, directors can provide more professional schemes for enterprises 
to implement product optimization, and to improve the exploitative innovation level and ability of 
enterprises. Meanwhile, directors are exposed to the latest discoveries or cutting-edge research in their 
areas when they receive a higher education level. They often break through the existing knowledge 
and technology limitations in the industry and provide opportunities for enterprises to implement 
exploratory innovation. Directors with a background in “output function” have been in the forefront 
of production and sales for a long time, and their long-term accumulated experiences enable them to 
have a clearer understanding of the product market and customer demand. It is usually the basis and 
key point for enterprises to carry out exploitative innovation. In addition, directors with a background 
in “output function” pay more attention to the research and development investment of enterprises. 
At the same time, they are the main promoters of the technological revolution, and effectively remove 
various obstacles in technological change and achieve a successful transformation. Therefore, directors 
with this background can significantly improve the level and ability of exploratory innovation. A 
board’s overseas experience can introduce foreign advanced technology and knowledge into 
enterprises, improve the technology and ability of enterprises as a whole, and promote the exploitative 
innovation of enterprises to achieve long-term development. Furthermore, it is helpful for enterprises 
to deepen their understanding of independent innovation [18], and identify new opportunities, which 
is of great significance for achieving technological breakthroughs and developing emerging markets, 
thus greatly improving the exploratory innovation level and capabilities of enterprises. 
In summary, board human capital can improve the level and ability of an enterprise’s 
ambidextrous innovation in two ways. First, it can use the existing knowledge, skills, and abilities to 
gradually improve the products and technologies of enterprises, and improve the level and ability of 
exploitative innovation of enterprises. Second, the breakthrough development of new products and 
technologies of enterprises can be realized by tackling key problems regarding new knowledge and 
technologies. Further, exploitative innovation can make full use of enterprise resources, realize 
iterative optimization of enterprise technology and products, and promote the improvement of the 
short-term financial performance of enterprises [40]. Exploratory innovation can solve the problem of 
insufficient core competitiveness of enterprises, alleviate the competitive pressure of enterprises, and 
have far-reaching significance toward building the core competitive advantages of enterprises. It can 
be seen that ambidextrous innovation has profoundly affected the improvement of short-term 
performance and the construction of long-term sustainable competitive advantage [41]. Therefore, 
board human capital can promote enterprise growth by influencing ambidextrous innovation; that is, 
ambidextrous innovation has an intermediary effect between board human capital and enterprise 
growth. Therefore, we hypothesize the following: 
H6. Exploitative innovation and exploratory innovation mediate between board human capital and enterprise 
growth. 
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H6a. Exploitative innovation and exploratory innovation mediate between a board’s education level and 
enterprise growth. 
H6b. Exploitative innovation and exploratory innovation mediate between a board’s professional background 
and enterprise growth. 
H6c. Exploitative innovation and exploratory innovation mediate between a board’s overseas experience and 
enterprise growth. 
The theoretical model of this study is shown in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1. Theoretical Model. 
3. Data Sources and Research Design 
3.1.Sample Selection and Data Sources 
We select Chinese A-share non-financial listed companies from 2008 to 2017 as the research 
sample, which specifically includes both of the A-share Main Board and SME Board listed 
companies of the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange in China, except financial and insurance 
firms. The reasons are as follows: First, the relevant field information on the board of directors 
disclosed by CSMAR (China Stock Market & Accounting Research) mainly started in 2008, and the 
10-year data are selected to ensure the validity of the regression results. Second, due to the large 
differences in accounting standards between the financial and insurance industries and other 
industries, the relevant indicators of the two industries are not comparable and they are eliminated. 
Third, the board structure of listed companies on the Main Board and SME Board has improved, and 
the corporate governance mechanism is reasonable, which is conducive to playing the role of board 
human capital. Fourth, considering that a board’s overseas experience is an important part of board 
human capital, due to the high internationalization level of listed companies on the main board and 
small and medium-sized board, the proportion of directors with overseas experience is relatively 
high. In contrast, gem enterprises are small in scale, with imperfect board governance structures and 
high risks, and as such, they are not included in the sample scope.  
In addition, we followed existing literature by removing ST (Special Treatment) and PT 
(Particular Transfer) listed company samples, and deleting samples with abnormal financial data 
and serious missing data. After screening, we finally obtained 17,357 initial samples. In order to 
prevent the extreme value, all continuous variables were subjected to a 1/99% winsorization. The 
statistical analysis software used was Stata14.0 (Source Location: Shihezi University, Shihezi, 
Xinjiang, China). 
3.2. Indicator Selection and Variable Definition 
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Dependent Variables: Enterprise Growth. Considering the cumulative effect of board human 
capital, Tobin’s Q, which reflects the ability of enterprise development, was used as the proxy 
variable for enterprise growth in accordance with the research of Wang et al. [42]. In the robustness 
test, we followed Fang et al. [43] and took the growth rate of the enterprise operating income as an 
alternative indicator of growth. 
Independent Variables: Board Human Capital (BHC). The board human capital was measured by 
three variables: board’s education level (DEI), board’s professional background (BAC), and board’s 
overseas experience (SEA). Among them, a board’s education level was calculated by taking the 
average of the highest education degree of directors, and organizing the education degree of 
directors from the lowest to the highest. The education level below the undergraduate degree was 
coded as 1, 2 for an undergraduate degree, 3 for a postgraduate degree, and 4 for a doctoral degree. 
A board’s professional background was measured by the proportion of the number of directors with 
the background of “output functions”, such as R&D, marketing, and design, in the total number of 
the board of directors [44]. A board’s overseas experience was measured using the proportion of 
directors with overseas experience to the total number of board members [16]. Drawing on the 
research of Wang et al. [45], board human capital was measured by standardizing and summing the 
board's education level, board’s professional background, and board’s overseas experience. 
Intermediary Variables: Ambidextrous Innovation. Ambidextrous innovation was specifically 
divided into two methods: exploitative innovation (IOTTOU) and exploratory innovation (IOTTOE). 
We used the method of Bi et al. [46] for reference to measure each of them. Exploitative innovation 
(IOTTOU) was measured using the ratio of capitalized R&D expenditures to total assets at the 
beginning of the year; and exploratory innovation (IOTTOE) was measured using the ratio of 
expensed R&D expenditures to total assets at the beginning of the year. 
Control Variables: In order to exclude the influence of other potential variables, the variables 
such as corporate characteristics and environmental characteristics are controlled by referring to 
relevant studies [43]. At the level of corporate characteristics, we control for enterprise size (SIZE), 
financial leverage (LEV), year of establishment (AGE), nature of ownership (STA), ownership 
concentration (SEC), and combined title of board chair and CEO (DOUL). At the level of 
environmental characteristics, we have controlled for macroeconomic growth rate (GDP). In 
addition, we use the dummy variables of annual (Year) and industry (IND) to control for the year 
and industry of the samples (see Table 1). 
Table 1. Definition of variables 
Variable Name Symbol Definition and Measurement 
Enterprise Growth Growth 
Tobin’s Q (value of outstanding shares + value of non-tradable shares 
+ book value of liabilities)/total assets 
Board's Education 
Level 
DEI 
Measured by the average number of the highest academic 
qualifications of the board of directors, where below an 
undergraduate degree is worth 1, the undergraduate degree is worth 
2, a postgraduate degree is worth 3, and a doctoral degree is worth 4 
Board's Professional 
Background 
BAC 
The proportion of directors with an “output function” background to 
the total number of board members 
Board's Overseas 
Experience 
SEA The proportion of directors who have overseas experience 
Board Human Capital BHC 
Board human capital is a composite indicator that is standardized and 
then is found by summing up a board's education level, professional 
background, and overseas experience  
Exploitative 
Innovation 
IOTTOU 
(Capitalized R&D expenditures divided by total assets at the 
beginning of the year) × 100% 
Exploratory 
Innovation 
IOTTOE 
(Expensed R&D expenditures divided by total assets at the beginning 
of the year) × 100% 
Enterprise Size SIZE ln (enterprise ending asset + 1) 
Financial Leverage LEV Asset–liability ratio = total liabilities divided by total assets 
Year of Establishment AGE ln (sample year minus year of establishment) 
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Nature of Ownership STA 
If it belongs to a state-owned enterprise, set to 1; otherwise, set to 0; 
dummy variable 
Ownership 
Concentration 
SEC Square sum of shareholding ratio of the top ten shareholders 
Macroeconomic 
Growth Rate 
GDP GDP growth rate of the province where the company is located 
combined title of 
board chair and CEO 
DOUL 
If the chairman and the general manager take a part-time job, set to 1; 
otherwise, set to 0; dummy variable 
Year Year Year1–Year10，dummy variable 
Industry IND IND1–IND21，dummy variable 
3.3. Model Setting 
Based on the research hypothesis, the following models were set up to be tested, where  is the 
intercept, βஓ(γ = 1, . . . ,13) are the coefficients, and ℰ is the random error term. 
Model 1 validates the relationship between board human capital and enterprise growth. 
Therefore, a regression model with board human capital as the independent variable was 
established to test hypothesis H1: 
𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ = 𝛼 + 𝛽ଵ,ଵ𝐵𝐻𝐶൫𝛽ଵ,ଶ𝐷𝐸𝐼 + 𝛽ଵ,ଷ𝐵𝐴𝐶 + 𝛽ଵ,ସ𝑆𝐸𝐴൯ + 𝛽ଵ,ହ𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 + 𝛽ଵ,଺𝐿𝐸𝑉 
         +𝛽ଵ,଻𝐴𝐺𝐸 + 𝛽ଵ,଼𝑆𝑇𝐴 + 𝛽ଵ,ଽ𝑆𝐸𝐶 + 𝛽ଵ,ଵ଴𝐺𝐷𝑃 + 𝛽ଵ,ଵଵ𝐷𝑂𝑈𝐿 
+ ෍ 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 + ෍ 𝐼𝑁𝐷 + ℰ 
(1) 
Model 2 validates the relationship between board human capital and ambidextrous innovation, 
which was used to test hypotheses H2 and H3: 
𝐼𝑂𝑇𝑇𝑂𝑈(𝐼𝑂𝑇𝑇𝑂𝐸) = 𝛼 + 𝛽ଶ,ଵ𝐵𝐻𝐶൫𝛽ଶ,ଶ𝐷𝐸𝐼 + 𝛽ଶ,ଷ𝐵𝐴𝐶 + 𝛽ଶ,ସ𝑆𝐸𝐴൯ + 𝛽ଶ,ହ𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 + 𝛽ଶ,଺𝐿𝐸𝑉 
        +𝛽ଶ,଻𝐴𝐺𝐸 + 𝛽ଶ,଼𝑆𝑇𝐴 + 𝛽ଶ,ଽ𝑆𝐸𝐶 + 𝛽ଶ,ଵ଴𝐺𝐷𝑃 
              +𝛽ଶ,ଵଵ𝐷𝑂𝑈𝐿 + ∑ 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 + ∑ 𝐼𝑁𝐷 + ℰ  
(2) 
Model 3 validates the relationship between ambidextrous innovation and enterprise growth, 
which was used to test hypotheses H4a and H4b: 
𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ = 𝛼 + 𝛽ଷ,ଵ𝐼𝑂𝑇𝑇𝑂𝑈(𝐼𝑂𝑇𝑇𝑂𝐸) + 𝛽ଷ,ଶ𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 + 𝛽ଷ,ଷ𝐿𝐸𝑉 + 𝛽ଷ,ସ𝐴𝐺𝐸 
       +𝛽ଷ,ହ𝑆𝑇𝐴 + 𝛽ଷ,଺𝑆𝐸𝐶 + 𝛽ଷ,଻𝐺𝐷𝑃 + 𝛽ଷ,଼𝐷𝑂𝑈𝐿  
+ ෍ 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 + ෍ 𝐼𝑁𝐷 + ℰ 
(3) 
Model 4 validates the relationship between ambidextrous innovation matching patterns and 
enterprise growth, which was used to test hypotheses H5a and H5b: 
𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ = 𝛼 + 𝛽ସ,ଵ𝐼𝑂𝑇𝑇𝑂𝑈 × 𝐼𝑂𝑇𝑇𝑂𝐸(|𝐼𝑂𝑇𝑇𝑂𝑈— 𝐼𝑂𝑇𝑇𝑂𝐸|) + 𝛽ସ,ଶ𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 
               +𝛽ସ,ଷ𝐿𝐸𝑉 + 𝛽ସ,ସ𝐴𝐺𝐸 + 𝛽ସ,ହ𝑆𝑇𝐴 + 𝛽ସ,଺𝑆𝐸𝐶 + 𝛽ସ,଻𝐺𝐷𝑃 + 𝛽ସ,଼𝐷𝑂𝑈𝐿 
+ ෍ 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 + ෍ 𝐼𝑁𝐷 + ℰ 
(4) 
Model 5 validates the mediating effect of ambidextrous innovation, which was used to test 
hypothesis H6: 
𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ = 𝛼 + 𝛽ହ,ଵ𝐵𝐻𝐶൫𝛽ହ,ଶ𝐷𝐸𝐼 + 𝛽ହ,ଷ𝐵𝐴𝐶 + 𝛽ହ,ସ𝑆𝐸𝐴൯ + 𝛽ହ,ହ𝐼𝑂𝑇𝑇𝑂𝑈(𝐼𝑂𝑇𝑇𝑂𝐸) 
            +𝛽ହ,଺𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 + 𝛽ହ,଻𝐿𝐸𝑉 + 𝛽ହ,଼𝐴𝐺𝐸 + 𝛽ହ,ଽ𝑆𝑇𝐴 + 𝛽ହ,ଵ଴𝑆𝐸𝐶 + 𝛽ହ,ଵଵ𝐺𝐷𝑃 
+𝛽ହ,ଵଶ𝐷𝑂𝑈𝐿 + ෍ 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 + ෍ 𝐼𝑁𝐷 + ℰ 
(5) 
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4. The Empirical Results and Analysis 
4.1. Variable Description 
The results of the variable description are shown in Table 2, where Panel A reports descriptive 
statistics and Panel B reports the results of mean-difference tests. Panel A shows that: (1) The 
standard deviation of the variable Growth was up to 1.8696, indicating that there was a certain 
difference in the growth of the sample enterprises. (2) The coefficient of variation of the variable BHC 
was 243.71%, indicating that the sample had strong volatility. This was because the standard 
deviation of the variable BHC was large but its mean value was small, which indicated that the 
board of directors of the listed companies in China had highly different levels of human capital. 
However, due to the level of human capital being generally low, once listed companies raise the 
level of board human capital through various methods, such as recruitment of talents and 
organization of training, they will make significant differences relative to most listed companies, 
which causes the high volatility of board human capital. (3) The mean value of the variable DEI was 
greater than 2.5 (a postgraduate degree was worth 3), and the coefficient of variation was 20.34%, 
indicating that a board’s education level of Chinese listed companies was relatively concentrated, 
and the average education level was close to a graduate degree. (4) The mean value of BAC was 
0.2742, which indicated that about one-third of the directors in the sample enterprises had 
experience in R&D, design, or marketing. (5) The standard deviation of the variable SEA was 0.1129, 
but the coefficient of variation was 124.2%, indicating that the sample was highly volatile. This was 
caused by the small mean value of the variable SEA, which indicates that the overseas experience of 
directors of Chinese-listed companies is relatively concentrated. However, due to its low average 
proportion, once a company had a large number of returnees, it was significantly different from 
most companies and its volatility was greater. (6) The coefficient of variation of the variable IOTTOU 
was 233.15%, which was much larger than the coefficient of variation of the variable IOTTOE, which 
was 110.77%. That is to say, although the standard deviation of the variable IOTTOE was large, the 
variable IOTTOU had a large variability with respect to its mean value, indicating that there were 
some differences in the level of exploitative innovation of listed companies in China compared with 
exploratory innovation, the average level of exploitative innovation R&D investment was low, and 
enterprises were more likely to catch up with innovation by increasing the investment; as such, the 
volatility of exploitative innovation was higher. (7) The standard deviation of the variable SIZE was 
1.2852, but its coefficient of variation was only 0.0582, which was related to the large mean value of 
the variable SIZE. This indicates that there were large differences in the size of sample companies, 
and due to the generally high average size of enterprises, it was difficult for smaller enterprises to 
expand their size in a short time; as such, their volatility was relatively small. Panel B divides the 
samples into two groups according to the average value of board human capital, and tests the 
differences between them. The mean-difference test results show that the higher the level of board 
human capital is, the greater the enterprise growth was, consistent with the hypotheses developed 
earlier. 
Table 2. Variable description 
Panel A：Descriptive Statistics of Variables 
Variable 
Name 
Observations Mean Min P50 Max SD CV 
Growth 17,357 2.1122 0.2038 1.5636 10.6556 1.8696 0.8851 
BHC 17,357 0.8116 –3.3133 0.6470 6.1729 1.9780 2.4371 
DEI 17,357 2.5456 1.0000 2.6000 3.7500 0.5178 0.2034 
BAC 17,357 0.2742 0.0000 0.2500 0.7778 0.1907 0.6954 
SEA 17,357 0.0909 0.0000 0.0714 0.5000 0.1129 1.2420 
IOTTOU 5796 0.3348 0.0000 0.0000 4.7003 0.7806 2.3315 
IOTTOE 2823 1.5479 0.0014 1.0902 9.5567 1.7146 1.1077 
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SIZE 17,357 22.0724 19.5809 21.9008 25.9794 1.2852 0.0582 
DOUL 17,357 0.2273 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.4191 1.8438 
SEC 17,357 0.1657 0.0143 0.1353 0.5717 0.1178 0.7109 
LEV 17,357 0.4434 0.0486 0.4419 0.8883 0.2103 0.4742 
AGE 17,357 2.6968 1.3863 2.7726 3.3673 0.3914 0.1451 
STA 17,357 0.4431 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.4968 1.1212 
GDP 17,357 0.1138 -0.2240 0.1037 0.3227 0.0554 0.4868 
Panel B：Molecular Variable Difference Test 
Explained 
Variable 
Explanatory 
Variables 
Sample Size Mean 
Mean Difference High Low High Low 
Growth BHC 8681 8676 2.292 1.932 0.360 *** 
Growth DEI 8427 8930 2.168 2.060 0.108 *** 
Growth BAC 8493 8864 2.298 1.934 0.364 *** 
Growth SEA 8836 8521 2.239 1.981 0.258 *** 
Note: (1) *, **, and *** represent the significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. (2) We use 
Table 3 to perform the mean-difference test between groups. (3) P50 means 50th Percentile, and CV 
means Coefficient of Variation. 
4.2. Correlation Analysis 
The correlation coefficient test results between variables are shown in Table 3. Correlation 
analysis shows that the variables BHC, DEI, BAC, and SEA were significantly and positively 
correlated with Growth (p < 0.01), indicating that a board’s education level, board’s professional 
background, and board’s overseas experience were positively related to enterprise growth. In other 
words, board human capital was significantly and positively related to enterprise growth, which is 
in line with the preliminary conjecture of former theoretical analysis. The correlation between the 
variables in the matrix was small, which indicates that there was little possibility of multiple 
collinearities. To further test the multicollinearity problem, we investigated the variance inflation 
factor (VIF) value, which ranged from 2.92 to 2.99, which was less than 10, indicating that there was 
little concern regarding multicollinearity in the regression model. In addition, in order to avoid the 
heteroscedasticity problem, a clustering robust standard error regression was carried out in the 
regression. 
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Table 3. Pearson correlation matrix between variables 
Note: *, **, and *** represent the significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
Variable Growth BHC DEI BAC SEA IOTTOU IOTTOE SIZE DOUL SEC LEV AGE STA 
BHC 0.046 ***             
DEI 0.119 *** 0.684 ***            
BAC 0.064 *** 0.637 *** 0.168 ***           
SEA 0.132 *** 0.736 *** 0.276 *** 0.184 ***          
IOTTOU 0.275 *** 0.128 *** 0.122 *** 0.066 *** 0.080 ***         
IOTTOE –0.487 *** 0.125 *** 0.0300 0.170 *** 0.069 *** 0.145 ***        
SIZE 0.138 *** 0.113 *** 0.150 *** –0.044 *** 0.121 *** –0.070 *** –0.196 ***       
DOUL –0.105 *** 0.084 *** 0.0050 0.109 *** 0.061 *** 0.059 *** 0.054 *** –0.151 ***      
SEC –0.454 *** 0.044 *** 0.057 *** –0.0120 0.043 *** –0.115 *** –0.123 *** 0.268 *** –0.066 ***     
LEV –0.058 *** –0.106 *** 0.025 *** –0.189 *** –0.058 *** –0.074 *** –0.207 *** 0.472 *** –0.149 *** 0.058 ***    
AGE –0.269 *** –0.052 *** 0.057 *** –0.133 *** –0.035 *** –0.080 *** –0.064 *** 0.185 *** –0.089 *** –0.169 *** 0.211 ***   
STA –0.102 *** –0.122 *** 0.095 *** –0.178 *** –0.159 *** –0.044 *** –0.154 *** 0.310 *** –0.282 *** 0.195 *** 0.311 *** 0.172 ***  
GDP 0.046 *** –0.152 *** –0.084 *** –0.143 *** –0.090 *** 0.083 *** 0.046 ** –0.121 *** –0.049 *** 0.024 *** 0.054 *** –0.192 *** 0.117 *** 
Sustainability 2019, 11, 3993 13 of 31 
4.3. Multiple Regression Results and Discussion 
OLS regression analysis was used to analyze the relationship between board human capital, 
ambidextrous innovation, and enterprise growth (Tables 4 and 5).  
The Relationship between Board Human Capital and Enterprise Growth. First, we examined the 
impact of board human capital on enterprise growth (Model 1) and report the results in Table 4. In 
columns (1) and (2) of Table 4, we show that the variable BHC was positively correlated with Growth 
(t = 10.0344, p < 0.01). That is, board human capital positively affected enterprise growth at a 
significant level of 1%, indicating that the higher the level of board human capital, the more 
beneficial it was to enterprise growth. From an economic perspective, every standard deviation 
increase of board human capital (1.9780) resulted in an enterprise growth improvement equivalent 
to 6.42% (= 0.0607 × 1.9780/1.8696) of the sample standard deviation. It can be seen that board human 
capital had a significant positive relationship with enterprise growth in both a statistical and 
economic sense. Therefore, H1 was supported. Further, when examining the impact of the sub-index 
of board human capital on enterprise growth, we found that the estimated coefficient of the variable 
DEI was positive (t = 9.4364, p < 0.01), and a board's education level had a positive impact on 
enterprise growth at a significance level of 1%. From an economic perspective, every standard 
deviation increase of a board’s education level (0.5178) resulted in an enterprise growth 
improvement equivalent to 6.01% (0.2170 × 0.5178/1.8696) of the sample standard deviation. 
Therefore, a board’s education level had a significantly positive impact on the enterprise growth, 
and H1a was supported. The estimated coefficient of variable BAC was significantly negative (t = 
−3.7042, p < 0.01), indicating that the more directors with an R&D, design, or marketing background 
on the board, the less likely an enterprise grew. This is inconsistent with the theoretical derivation, 
which may be due to the fact that the board of directors is composed of members from different 
professional fields that can hardly reach a unified opinion on the various opinions and suggestions 
provided during the meeting [47]. Moreover, the confusion and problems, such as communication, 
will appear frequently, and the emergence of these problems is not conducive to the formulation and 
implementation of enterprise strategic decision-making, thus threatening the survival and 
development of enterprises. Furthermore, the increasingly fierce global economic integration and 
market competition put forward higher requirements for the standardized management of 
enterprises, which not only requires senior executives to have a certain professional background, but 
also requires them to have professional management knowledge, management art, and 
organizational ability. When the number of directors with a background in "output function" in the 
board was more, it also meant the number of directors with professional management experience 
was less, which was not conducive to the development of enterprises in the long run. H1b was 
therefore rejected. The variable SEA was positively correlated with Growth (t = 7.1741, p < 0.01), 
where a board’s overseas experience had a positive impact on enterprise growth at a significance 
level of 1%. From an economic perspective, every standard deviation increase of a board’s overseas 
experience (0.1129) resulted in an enterprise growth improvement equivalent to 4.60% (= 0.7625 × 
0.1129/1.8696) of the sample standard deviation. To sum up, the more directors with overseas 
educational and work experience in the board, the more conducive it was to enterprise growth. H1c 
was therefore supported.  
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Table 4. Results of regression analysis 
 
Corporate Growth Ambidextrous Innovation Corporate Growth 
Main Index Sub-Indexes Main Index Sub-Indexes Main Index Sub-Indexes Main Index Sub-Indexes Main Index Sub-Indexes 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Growth Growth IOTTOU IOTTOU IOTTOE IOTTOE Growth Growth Growth Growth 
BHC 
0.0607  0.0281 ***  0.0590 ***  0.0577 ***  0.0570 ***  
(10.0344)  (5.6093)  (4.0222)  (5.3094)  (5.0828)  
DEI 
 0.2170 ***  0.0926 ***  –0.0257  0.2404 ***  0.1950 *** 
 (9.4364)  (4.5698)  (–0.5592)  (5.7808)  (4.8451) 
BAC 
 –0.2452 ***  0.0318  0.6940 ***  –0.1780  –0.0738 
 (–3.7042)  (0.6007)  (4.3086)  (–1.5079)  (–0.5910) 
SEA 
 0.7625 ***  0.2326 ***  0.6614 **  0.5966 ***  0.4580 ** 
 (7.1741)  (2.6023)  (2.3088)  (3.1544)  (2.4243) 
IOTTOU 
      0.1920 *** 0.1873 ***   
      (5.4379) (5.3453)   
IOTTOE 
        0.0940 *** 0.0977 *** 
        (3.7612) (3.9128) 
SIZE 
–0.6227 *** –0.6305 *** 0.0419 *** 0.0405 *** –0.0671 ** –0.0643 ** –0.7215 *** –0.7287 *** –0.4904 *** –0.4925 *** 
(–40.6539) (–40.9380) (4.2134) (4.0569) (–2.3564) (–2.2700) (–26.0643) (–26.2623) (–14.5857) (–14.7627) 
DOUL 
0.0610 ** 0.0619 ** 0.0417* 0.0413* 0.0431 0.0500 0.0770 0.0760 0.0000 –0.0056 
(2.1114) (2.1462) (1.7920) (1.7788) (0.5374) (0.6232) (1.5824) (1.5659) (0.0001) (–0.0872) 
SEC 
–1.7957 *** –1.8188 *** –0.6974 *** –0.6945 *** –0.2583 –0.2463 1.8842 *** 1.8863 *** 0.8916 *** 0.8907 *** 
(–21.8107) (–22.1290) (–8.2043) (–8.1912) (–0.9856) (–0.9382) (9.5622) (9.5994) (4.6664) (4.6464) 
LEV 
0.1277 *** 0.0911 *** –0.0009 –0.0082 –1.1725 *** –1.1455 *** –2.2726 *** –2.2961 *** –1.6273 *** –1.6421 *** 
(3.9425) (2.8243) (–0.0146) (–0.1319) (–6.6075) (–6.4277) (–15.3928) (–15.5470) (–9.4086) (–9.6370) 
AGE 
0.9888 *** 0.9934 *** –0.0458 –0.0513 –0.4132 *** –0.3872 *** 0.0455 0.0182 –0.0274 –0.0488 
(10.7459) (10.8621) (–1.3729) (–1.5343) (–4.3620) (–4.0765) (0.6820) (0.2727) (–0.3713) (–0.6533) 
STA 
–0.2196 *** –0.2299 *** 0.0088 0.0022 –0.2322 *** –0.2228 *** –0.1937 *** –0.2089 *** –0.0969 ** –0.1007 ** 
(–9.0338) (–9.2348) (0.3813) (0.0918) (–3.3147) (–3.1755) (–4.2092) (–4.3657) (–2.0260) (–2.0516) 
GDP 
0.8396 *** 0.8687 *** 0.4503 ** 0.4625 ** 0.7925 0.7633 0.8150 0.8618 –0.7867 –0.7676 
(2.6127) (2.7054) (2.1033) (2.1633) (1.0400) (0.9977) (1.2815) (1.3556) (–0.9957) (–0.9781) 
Year/ IND Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
_cons 
14.8822 *** 14.5916 *** 0.1368 –0.0791 2.8357 *** 2.6104 *** 17.0990 *** 16.6805 *** 12.0881 *** 11.6776 *** 
(48.8389) (47.2012) (0.4565) (–0.2595) (3.6644) (3.4293) (23.3873) (22.7191) (16.5577) (16.4191) 
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N 17357 17357 5796 5796 2823 2823 5796 5796 2823 2823 
r2_a 0.4620 0.4648 0.1922 0.1930 0.3097 0.3119 0.4904 0.4924 0.4586 0.4606 
F 293.7056 279.4808 24.6360 23.1309 43.8956 43.6087 117.3294 111.8225 49.6169 47.8545 
Note: (1) *, **, and *** represent the significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. (2) The values in parentheses are t-statistics after correcting for heteroscedasticity. 
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Table 5. Results of the regression analysis of the binary innovation matching model 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Growth Growth Growth Growth 
IOTTOU 
0.2034 ***    
(5.7919)    
IOTTOE 
 0.1000 ***   
 (4.0133)   
IOTTOU × IOTTOE 
  0.0033  
  (0.1715)  
| IOTTOU − IOTTOE | 
   0.0680 ** 
   (2.0907) 
SIZE 
–0.7105 *** –0.4703 *** –0.4743 *** –0.4706 *** 
(–25.6524) (–14.4574) (–12.4424) (–12.2133) 
DOUL 
0.0909* –0.0015 0.0619 0.0613 
(1.8605) (–0.0233) (0.7100) (0.7159) 
SEC 
1.9020 *** 0.9735 *** 1.1045 *** 1.0489 *** 
(9.6745) (5.1049) (4.9875) (4.5760) 
LEV 
–2.3088 *** –1.6554 *** –1.9319 *** –1.8725 *** 
(–15.6338) (–9.5673) (–9.3412) (–9.5439) 
AGE 
0.0072 –0.0554 –0.1735 ** –0.1535* 
(0.1096) (–0.7541) (–2.0903) (–1.8410) 
STA 
–0.1945 *** –0.0883* –0.0913 –0.0813 
(–4.1988) (–1.8290) (–1.5037) (–1.3657) 
GDP 
0.8398 –0.7598 –0.0013 –0.0985 
(1.3220) (–0.9715) (–0.0012) (–0.0909) 
Year/ IND Y Y Y Y 
_cons 
16.9170 *** 11.6583 *** 11.9160 *** 11.8401 *** 
(23.0408) (16.3150) (13.4162) (13.2999) 
N 5796 2823 1725 1725 
r2_a 0.4878 0.4533 0.4784 0.4831 
F 118.8685 50.5730 33.6066 33.7751 
Note: (1) *, **, and *** represent the significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. (2) The 
values in parentheses are t-statistics after correcting heteroscedasticity. 
The Relationship between Board Human Capital and Ambidextrous Innovation. According to Model 2, 
the relationship was tested between board human capital and ambidextrous innovation, and the 
estimated results are shown in Table 4. In columns (3)–(6) of Table 4, we show that Model 3 
contained the main effect of board human capital and ambidextrous innovation, which was mainly 
used to verify hypothesis H2. The results show that the variable BHC was positively correlated with 
IOTTOU and IOTTOE (t = 5.6093, p < 0.01; t = 4.0222, p < 0.01), where board human capital positively 
affected ambidextrous innovation at a 1% significance level, indicating that the higher the level of 
board human capital, the more conducive it was toward improving the level of corporate binary 
innovation. Therefore, H2 and H3 were supported. Due to the difference between exploitation 
innovation and exploratory innovation in the demand for resources and capabilities, we further 
studied the impact of the sub-index of board human capital on ambidextrous innovation, and found 
that the variables DEI and SEA were positively correlated with IOTTOU (t = 4.5698, p < 0.01; t = 
2.6023, p < 0.01), but BAC was not significantly correlated with IOTTOU (t = 0.6007, p > 0.1). This 
suggests that a board’s education level and overseas experience have a positive impact on the 
exploitation innovation at a significance level of 1%. This shows that the higher the education level 
of directors, the more overseas experience directors have, the more conducive to improving the 
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utilization of existing knowledge and technology, leading to achieving technological progress and 
product optimization, and promoting the level of exploitation innovation. However, a board’s 
professional background had no significant positive correlation with exploitation innovation, which 
is inconsistent with the theoretical derivation. This may be related to the nature of exploitation 
innovation. Exploitation innovation requires sufficient knowledge and skills to improve and 
optimize existing products, which is independent of whether directors have the background of 
"export function." It can be seen that H2a and H2c were supported and H2b was rejected. The 
variables BAC and SEA were positively correlated with IOTTOE (t = 4.3086, p < 0.01; t = 2.3088, p < 
0.05), while DEI was negatively correlated with IOTTOE (t = −0.5592, p > 0.1), suggesting that a 
board’s professional background and overseas experience had a positive impact on exploratory 
innovation at a significance level of 1% and 5%, respectively, indicating that the more background in 
"output function" and overseas experience directors had, the more conducive they were to acquiring 
new knowledge and skills and to achieving a breakthrough innovation. However, a board's 
education level was negatively correlated with exploratory innovation and was not significant, 
which is inconsistent with the theoretical deduction. This may be related to the highly educated 
directors' strong sense of risk aversion and lower participation in high-risk, high-return R&D and 
investment projects. Therefore, H3b and H3c were supported, and H3a was rejected.  
The Relationship between Ambidextrous Innovation and Enterprise Growth. The relationship between 
ambidextrous innovation and enterprise growth was tested according to Models 3 and 4, and the 
estimated results are shown in Table 5. In the columns (1)–(4) of Table 5, we show that Model 3 
mainly validated whether ambidextrous innovation can promote enterprise growth, and was used 
to test H4a and H4b. The regression results show that both IOTTOU and IOTTOE were positively 
correlated with Growth (t = 5.7919, p < 0.01; t = 4.0133, p < 0.01), suggesting that both exploitation 
innovation and exploratory innovation had a positive impact on enterprise growth at a significance 
level of 1%. Therefore, H4a and H4b were supported. Model 4 mainly verified the influence of the 
matching mode of binary innovation on enterprise growth, which was used to test H5a and H5b. 
The regression results show that the balance effect of exploitation innovation and exploratory 
innovation had a weak but significantly positive impact on enterprise growth (t = 2.0907, p < 0.05), 
while the product effect had little significant association with enterprise growth (t = 0.1715, p > 0.1). 
Therefore, H5a was supported and H5b was rejected. 
The Mediating Effect of Ambidextrous Innovation. Using the methods of Wen et al. [48] and 
combining Models 1, 2, and 5, we tested whether ambidextrous innovation had an intermediary 
effect on the relationship between board human capital and enterprise growth according to the 
following procedures. The first step was to test whether the coefficient 𝛽ଵ,ଵ  of Model 1 was 
statistically significant. If the subsequent test was established, it was a mediating effect; otherwise, it 
was a masking effect. In the second step, the coefficient 𝛽ଶ,ଵ of Model 2 and the coefficient 𝛽ହ,ହ of 
Model 5 were tested successively. If both were significant, it was an indirect effect, and the fourth 
step was carried out; otherwise, the next step was carried out. In the third step, we used the 
bootstrap method to test 𝐻0: 𝛽ଶ,ଵ · 𝛽ହ,ହ = 0. If the result was significant, it was an indirect effect, and 
then proceeded to the next step; otherwise, the indirect effect was not significant and we stopped the 
analysis. The fourth step was to test the coefficient 𝛽ହ,ଵ  of Model 5. If it was significant, the direct 
effect was significant and the next step was carried out; otherwise, the direct effect was not 
significant and only the intermediary effect existed. The fifth step was to compare 𝛽ଶ,ଵ · 𝛽ହ,ହ and 
𝛽ହ,ଵ. If the sign was the same, they belonged to a partial mediation effect; if not, it was a masking 
effect. Based on the above research methods and the regression results in columns (1)–(9) of Table 4, 
we found that in the previous analysis, it was known that 𝛽ଵ,ଵ and 𝛽ଶ,ଵ were significant. After 
adding exploitation innovation into the regression equation, the regression coefficient of 
exploitation innovation on enterprise growth in column (7) was positively correlated at the 1% 
significance level (t = 5.4379, p < 0.01) where 𝛽ହ,ହ was significant. Moreover, by comparing columns 
(1) and (7), the regression coefficient of the board human capital was reduced to some degree, but it 
was still positively correlated at the significant level of 1% (t = 5.3094, p < 0.01); that is, 𝛽ହ,ଵ was 
significant. Since the signs of 𝛽ଶ,ଵ · 𝛽ହ,ହ  and 𝛽ହ,ଵ were the same, exploitation innovation 
played an intermediary role in the relationship between board human capital and enterprise growth. 
Next, we considered the mediating effects of exploratory innovation. Similar to the analysis of the 
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mediating effect of exploitation innovation, exploratory innovation also played a partial mediating 
role in the relationship between board human capital and enterprise growth. Therefore, 
ambidextrous innovation played an intermediary role in board human capital and enterprise 
growth, and H6 was supported. 
Further, we examined the mediating effect of ambidextrous innovation on the index of board 
human capital and enterprise growth, and the results are shown in columns (2)–(10) of Table 4. We 
found that exploitation innovation played part of the mediating effect on a board’s education level 
and enterprise growth, while exploratory innovation had no significant indirect effect on a board’s 
education level and enterprise growth. The indirect effect of exploitation innovation on a board’s 
professional background and enterprise growth was not significant, and exploratory innovation 
played a covering effect on a board’s professional background and enterprise growth. Ambidextrous 
innovation played part of the mediating effect between a board’s overseas experience and enterprise 
growth (Considering the mediating effect of IOTTOE on DEI and Growth, since βଶ,ଶ < 0 , the 
bootstrap method was used to test and p = 0.441 was obtained. Therefore, the indirect effect was not 
significant. Considering the mediating effect of IOTTOE between BAC and Growth, we adopted the 
bootstrap test and obtained p = 0.000; that is, the indirect effect was significant, but there was a 
masking effect due to the difference between βଶ,ଷ · βହ,ହ and  βହ,ଷ. Similarly, the indirect effect of 
IOTTOU on BAC and Growth was not significant). In conclusion, H6c was supported, H6a was 
partially supported, and H6b was rejected. 
4.4. Robustness Test 
In order to verify the reliability of the regression results, we conducted the robustness tests from 
the following aspects.  
Problem with Measurement Error. The growth rate of business income was adopted as a substitute 
indicator for growth. Considering the cumulative effect of board human capital, we take t+1 period 
and t+2 period for enterprise growth., and then conducted the regression of the main effect of board 
human capital on enterprise growth. The specific results of the indicator replacement are shown in 
columns (1) and (2) of Table 6. We found no matter whether t+1 period or t+2 period was applied, 
board human capital still had a significantly positive impact on enterprise growth (t = 2.6780, p < 
0.01; t =2.4669, p < 0.05).  
Problems with Legacy Variables. Since the characteristics of enterprises also affected enterprise 
growth, there could be a problem of legacy variables; therefore, we adopted the placebo test to 
examine this possibility. Specifically, we randomly sorted board human capital in the sample before 
the regression analysis. If the result after regression was no longer significant, it indicated that board 
human capital was related to enterprise growth. On the contrary, if the result was still significant, it 
indicated that the basic regression result may have been caused by omitted variables. The results of 
the placebo test are shown in column (3) of Table 6, with little association between board human 
capital after reordering and enterprise growth, indicating that board human capital promoted 
enterprise growth, and the results were not caused by other omitted variables. 
Problems with Reverse Causality. In the theoretical derivation part, it was concluded that the 
higher the board human capital is, the better it is at improving enterprise growth. However, 
enterprises with higher growth may also tend to choose directors with a higher human capital level 
to form the board of directors. There may be a causal endogeneity problem between board human 
capital and enterprise growth. In order to reduce the interference of endogeneity problems, we chose 
the average board human capital grouped by year and industry as the instrumental variable (IV). 
The average board human capital in the same industry and year was related to board human capital 
but did not affect enterprise growth. Subsequently, we used a two-stage least squares regression 
(2SLS) to test the weak instrumental variables. The results showed that Shea's Partial R2 was less than 
0.01, but the F statistic was 85.7294, and the p-value of the F statistic is 0. Therefore, the average 
board human capital was not a weak instrumental variable. Column (4) in Table 6 gives the 
regression results of the first stage, showing that the estimated coefficient of the instrumental 
variable (IV) was significantly positive (t = 0.1000, p < 0.01). Column (5) is the second-stage regression 
result, showing that even after considering endogeneity problems, board human capital was still 
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significantly positively associated with enterprise growth at significance the level of 1% (t = 0.0790, p 
< 0.01), suggesting that board human capital had a significantly positive impact on enterprise 
growth. 
Table 6. Robustness test regression results 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
F. Growth F2. Growth Growth BHC Growth 
BHC 
0.0056 *** 0.0056 **   0.156 ** 
(2.6780) (2.4669)   (0.0790) 
r–BHC 
  –0.0037   
  (–0.7189)   
iv 
   0.929 ***  
   (0.100)  
SIZE 
–0.0410 *** –0.0522 *** –0.6083 *** 0.233 *** –0.645 *** 
(–7.7092) (–9.4162) (–39.8576) (0.0147) (0.0238) 
DOUL 
0.0114 –0.0018 0.0692 ** 0.135 *** 0.0480 
(1.1775) (–0.1617) (2.3938) (0.0350) (0.0306) 
LEV 
0.1314 *** 0.0438 –1.8376 *** –0.658 *** –1.731 *** 
(4.4741) (1.4252) (–22.2724) (0.0820) (0.0984) 
AGE 
–0.0280 *** –0.0159 0.0915 *** –0.597 *** 0.184 *** 
(–2.6019) (–1.3648) (2.8590) (0.0421) (0.0573) 
SEC 
0.0250 0.0603 1.0292 *** 0.670 *** 0.925 *** 
(0.7527) (1.6372) (11.1710) (0.129) (0.107) 
STA 
–0.0557 *** –0.0477 *** –0.2328 *** –0.210 *** –0.199 *** 
(–5.8901) (–4.6853) (–9.5398) (0.0337) (0.0297) 
GDP 
0.0924 –0.1655 0.7943 ** –0.703* 0.906 *** 
(0.7333) (–1.1045) (2.4688) (0.400) (0.328) 
Year/IND Y Y Y Y Y 
_cons 
0.9263 *** 1.4490 *** 14.6411 *** –3.096 *** 15.26 *** 
(8.3685) (12.2863) (48.1461) (0.348) (0.432) 
N 14,684 12,598 17,357 17,357 17,357 
r2_a 0.0431 0.0427 0.4585 0.172 0.455 
F 17.2305 16.3214 290.3378 – – 
Note: (1) *, **, and *** represent the significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively; (2) The 
values in parentheses are the t-statistics after the heteroscedasticity is corrected. – 
5. Further Discussion: The Influencing Factors of Enterprise Growth and Ambidextrous 
Innovation 
The above analysis has passed the H1, H2, H3, H4a, and H4b tests, which further verifies and 
enriches the theoretical analysis framework of “enterprise resources—enterprise 
capabilities—enterprise growth.” However, as a typical internal orientation theory, it excessively 
weakens the influence of external environmental factors on enterprise growth. When enterprises 
choose a growth strategy, they will carry out a corresponding risk prediction and environmental 
assessment, and pay more attention to industry differences and market competition. Existing studies 
show the resource and capacity requirements of industries with different factor intensities are 
different. For example, in labor-intensive, capital-intensive, and technology-intensive industries, due 
to the obvious difference in the importance of technology, the investment in technological 
innovation of each industry is not the same [49]. Among different factor intensive industries, will 
there be industry differences in the promotion effect of board human capital and ambidextrous 
innovation on enterprise growth? In addition, the R&D resources investment of enterprises is not 
only influenced by the preferences of the board of directors or management or the balance of power, 
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but also by the industry characteristics and market concentration and other macro factors [50,51]. 
Similarly, will the impact of board human capital on ambidextrous innovation be affected by 
industry differences or market competition? Based on the above considerations, we proceeded with 
the influencing factors of enterprise growth and innovation respectively, and performed a grouping 
regression on the basis of Models 2, 3, and 4, and further differentiation analysis of the above 
assumptions.  
5.1. Analysis of Factors Affecting Enterprise Growth 
Based on the industry classification of the China Securities Regulatory Commission in 2001, we 
removed the insurance and financial industries, and ranked the manufacturing industry with other 
industries. We finally obtained 21 industries. Drawing on the cluster analysis method of Lu et al. 
[49], samples were divided into labor-intensive, capital-intensive, and technology-intensive types 
according to the factor density. At the same time, according to the "Management Measures for the 
Recognition of High-Tech Enterprises" promulgated by China in 2008, the technology-intensive 
industries were identified as high-tech industries, and other industries were identified as 
non-high-tech industries. The specific classification results are shown in Table 7. 
Table 7. Classification of non-high-tech industries and high-tech industries 
High-tech 
industry 
C5 (Electronic) C9 (Other manufacturing) 
C7 (Machinery, equipment, and 
instruments) G (Information technology industry) 
C8 (Medicine and biological products)  
Non-high-tech 
industry 
A (Agriculture, forestry, animal husbandry, 
and fishery) 
D (Electricity, gas, and water production 
and supply) 
B (Extractive industry) E (Construction industry) 
C0 (Food and drink) F (Transportation and warehousing) 
C1 (Textile, clothing, and fur) H (Wholesale and retail trade) 
C2 (Wood and furniture) J (Real estate industry) 
C3 (Paper and printing) K (Social service industry) 
C4 (Petroleum, chemical, and plastic) L (Communication and cultural industry) 
C6 (Metal and non-metal) M (Miscellaneous) 
Board Human Capital and Enterprise Growth: Comparison by Industry. First of all, we compared the 
differences between board human capital and enterprise growth in different industries. The 
regression results in columns (1) and (2) of Table 8 show that, consistent with the regression results 
of the whole sample, the estimated coefficient of board human capital (BHC) in both high-tech and 
non-high-tech industries were significantly positive (t = 7.4060, p < 0.01; t = 7.4175, p < 0.01). In order 
to further test whether there were differences in the coefficients between groups after the grouping 
regression, we conducted a SUR (Seemingly Unrelated Regression) test based on the seemingly 
unrelated model. The empirical value P1 in columns (1) and (2) of Table 8 was less than 0.1, which 
indicates that the promotion effect of board human capital on enterprise growth was significantly 
different between industries, and the promotion effect was more significant in the high-tech 
industry. Consistent with the existing research, due to the outstanding characteristics of high 
innovation and high growth of the high-tech industry, its developmental results often rely on the 
high-quality talents of enterprises, including the senior management talents of enterprises. 
Therefore, the contribution of board human capital to the growth of high-tech industries was much 
higher than that of non-high-tech industries. Further, the regression results in columns (3) and (4) of 
Table 8 show that, consistent with the whole sample regression results, in both high-tech and 
non-high-tech industries, a board’s education level (DEI) and overseas experience (SEA) were 
positively correlated with enterprise growth, and there was no significant industry difference 
(empirical values P2 and P4 corresponding to columns (3) and (4) in Table 8 were all greater than 
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0.1), indicating that a board’s education level and overseas experience were of great significance for 
improving enterprise growth. There were significant industry differences in the negative correlation 
between board’s professional background and enterprise growth (the empirical value P3, 
corresponding to columns (3) and (4) in Table 8, was less than 0.1), which was more significant in 
non-high-tech industries. This may have been because non-high-tech industries are more risk-averse 
than high-tech ones. However, directors with a background in "output function" often face the 
pressure of product market and development, and they tend to try high-risk, high-return investment 
projects. Therefore, the more directors with an “output function” background, the higher the risk of 
a strategic decision made by the board of directors, which was not conducive to the long-term 
development of the enterprise. In this case, the negative correlation between a board’s professional 
background and enterprise growth was more significant in non-high-tech industries. 
Ambidextrous Innovation and Enterprise Growth: Comparison by Industry. We compared the 
difference between ambidextrous innovation and enterprise growth in different industries. The 
regression results in columns (5)–(8) of Table 8 show that, consistent with the whole sample 
regression results, the estimated coefficients of exploitative innovation were significant in both 
high-tech and non-high-tech industries (t = 5.3323, p < 0.01; t = 6.8835, p < 0.01). For this reason, we 
further tested whether there were differences in coefficients between groups. The results show that 
there were significant industry differences in the promotion effect of exploitative innovation on 
enterprise growth (the empirical value P1 corresponding to columns (5) and (6) in Table 8 was less 
than 0.1), which was more significant in non-high-tech industries. This shows that although both 
industries attached importance to the optimization of existing technologies and products, 
non-high-tech enterprises were more dependent on exploitative innovation due to the existence of 
serious exploratory innovation shortcomings, further indicating the importance of exploitative 
innovation to the growth of non-high-tech enterprises. In the high-tech industry, the estimated 
coefficient of exploratory innovation was significantly positive (t = 6.4603, p < 0.01), but this 
significant relationship did not exist in the non-high-tech industry (t = 1.4586, p > 0.1) where there 
was a significant industry difference in the role of exploratory innovation in promoting enterprise 
growth, which was more significant in the high-tech industry. This is consistent with the actual 
situation. Due to the low level of non-high-tech industries, the lack of innovation resources and the 
insufficient investment in innovation, it is difficult to break through the existing knowledge and 
technology and open up new markets. Therefore, exploratory innovation has not become the main 
driving force for the growth of non-high-tech enterprises. 
Table 8. Board human capital and enterprise growth: comparison by industry 
 
BHC-Growth IOTTOU(IOTTOE)-Growth 
High-Tec
h 
Non-High-T
ech 
High-Tec
h 
Non-High-T
ech 
High-Tec
h 
Non-High-T
ech 
High-Tec
h 
Non-High-T
ech 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Growth Growth Growth Growth Growth Growth Growth Growth 
BHC 
0.0729 *** 0.0512 ***       
(7.4060) (7.4175)       
DEI 
  0.2662 *** 0.1915 ***     
  (6.6527) (7.5327)     
BAC 
  –0.1325 –0.3569 ***     
  (–1.3130) (–4.5530)     
SEA 
  0.8116 *** 0.7086 ***     
  (4.8368) (5.8571)     
IOTTOU 
    0.1756 *** 0.3932 ***   
    (5.3323) (6.8835)   
IOTTOE 
      0.1294 *** 0.0325 
      (6.4603) (1.4586) 
SIZE 
–0.7105 
*** 
–0.5694 *** 
–0.7182 
*** 
–0.5775 *** 
–0.7985 
*** 
–0.5988 *** 
–0.6204 
*** 
–0.3604 *** 
(–36.9266) (–44.9897) (–37.2055) (–45.5374) (–25.6138) (–20.8058) (–17.2792) (–15.3996) 
DOUL 
0.0322 0.0863 ** 0.0312 0.0896 *** 0.0780 0.1029 –0.0733 0.0086 
(0.7897) (2.5747) (0.7666) (2.6835) (1.2404) (1.6126) (–0.7306) (0.1230) 
SEC 1.3353 *** 0.7584 *** 1.3447 *** 0.7609 *** 2.2262 *** 1.4519 *** 0.8738 ** 0.9225 *** 
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(7.4474) (6.7631) (7.5177) (6.8082) (7.3632) (5.6102) (2.5124) (4.3291) 
LEV 
–1.8625 
*** 
–1.7720 *** 
–1.9223 
*** 
–1.7690 *** 
–2.0487 
*** 
–2.6093 *** 
–1.2065 
*** 
–2.0004 *** 
(–17.0890) (–23.5617) (–17.5914) (–23.5953) (–11.2052) (–15.5729) (–5.2508) (–13.7748) 
AGE 
0.1061 ** 0.1588 *** 0.0791 0.1135 *** 0.0344 0.0011 –0.1267 0.0439 
(2.0330) (4.0156) (1.5105) (2.8535) (0.3785) (0.0130) (–0.8878) (0.5075) 
STA 
–0.1291 
*** 
–0.2700 *** 
–0.1364 
*** 
–0.2843 *** 
–0.1909 
*** 
–0.2280 *** –0.1665 ** –0.0371 
(–2.9550) (–9.0948) (–3.0781) (–9.4249) (–2.6094) (–3.4634) (–2.0911) (–0.6612) 
GDP 
0.4346 0.8087 ** 0.4539 0.8454 ** 0.6882 0.7549 –0.7605 –1.0149 
(0.7765) (2.2331) (0.8125) (2.3423) (0.8083) (1.0436) (–0.6579) (–1.5004) 
Year/ 
IND 
Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
_cons 
16.8499 
*** 
13.8312 *** 
16.3922 
*** 
13.6497 *** 
19.5368 
*** 
14.4517 *** 
15.9327 
*** 
9.7328 *** 
(39.3943) (47.3334) (37.7496) (45.9696) (25.9331) (16.0864) (14.4968) (9.3692) 
N 7095 10262 7095 10262 3270 2526 1237 1586 
r2_a 0.4489 0.4475 0.4513 0.4512 0.4674 0.4957 0.4473 0.4464 
F 276.1123 260.6973 254.6637 249.1599 137.5930 78.5523 48.6276 40.9344 
P1 0.0818 – 0.0426 0.0208 
P2 – 0.1263 – – 
P3 – 0.0930 – – 
P4  0.6357   
Note: (1) *, **, and *** represent the significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. (2) The 
values in parentheses are the t-statistics after the heteroscedasticity was corrected. (3) We apply 
suest to test the difference between the coefficients of the group. Among them, the empirical values 
P1, P2, P3, and P4 were used to test the difference between BHC, DEI, BAC, and SEA coefficients 
between groups. 
5.2. Analysis of the Influencing Factors of Ambidextrous Innovation 
Board Human Capital and Ambidextrous Innovation: Comparison by Industry. First of all, we 
compared the difference between board human capital and exploitative innovation by industry. The 
regression results in columns (1) and (2) of Table 9 show that the estimation coefficient of board 
human capital was significantly positive in the high-tech industry (t = 6.0162, p < 0.01), but not 
significant in the non-high-tech industry (t = 0.7488, p > 0.1). The difference test of inter-group 
coefficients was consistent with the significant results, where there was a significant industry 
difference in the promotion effect of board human capital on exploitative innovation (the empirical 
value P1 corresponding to columns (1) and (2) in Table 9 was less than 0.1), and it had a greater effect 
in the high-tech industry. Further, the regression results in columns (3) and (4) of Table 9 show that 
in the high-tech industry, the estimated coefficients of a board’s professional background (BAC) 
were not significant (t = 1.3517, p > 0.1), but the estimated coefficients of a board’s education level 
(DEI) and overseas experience (SEA) were significantly positive (t = 5.6824, p < 0.01; t = 2.1138, p < 
0.05). Meanwhile, in the non-high-tech industry, the above estimated coefficients were not 
significant. In order to prevent estimation errors, we further tested whether there were differences in 
coefficient between groups, and the results show that there were significant industry differences in 
the promotion effect of a board’s education level on exploitative innovation (the empirical value P2 
corresponding to columns (3) and (4) in Table 9 was less than 0.1), and the effect was more 
significant in the high-tech industry. There was no industry difference in a board’s professional 
background and overseas experience (the empirical values P3 and P4 corresponding to columns (3) 
and (4) in Table 9 were greater than 0.1). Among them, the estimation coefficient of a board’s 
professional background was not significant between groups, which means that the number of 
directors with an “output function” background on the board of directors did not affect the level and 
ability of the exploitative innovation of enterprises. 
Then, we compared the differences between board human capital and exploratory innovation 
in different industries, and the regression results in columns (5) and (6) of Table 9 show that, 
consistent with the regression results of the whole sample, the estimated coefficient of board human 
capital was significantly positive in both high-tech and non-high-tech industries (t = 2.1835, p < 0.05; t 
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= 3.8540, p < 0.01). We further tested whether there were differences in the coefficient between 
groups, and the results show that board human capital had no significant industrial difference in 
promoting exploratory innovation (the empirical value P1 corresponding to columns (5) and (6) in 
Table 9 was greater than 0.1), indicating the importance of board human capital in promoting 
exploratory innovation in various industries. 
Further, the regression results in columns (7) and (8) of Table 9 show that in non-high-tech 
industries, the estimated coefficient of a board’s education level (DEI) was not significant (t = 
−0.9498, p > 0.1), and the estimated coefficient of a board’s professional background (BAC) and 
overseas experience (SEA) were both significantly positive (t = 5.3332, p < 0.01; t = 2.4582, p < 0.05); 
meanwhile, the estimated coefficient was not significant in high-tech industries. In order to prevent 
estimation errors, we further tested whether there were differences in the coefficient between 
groups. The results show that there were no significant industry differences in the promotion effect 
of a board’s education level, professional background, and overseas experience on exploratory 
innovation (empirical values P2–P4 corresponding to columns (7) and (8) in Table 9 were all greater 
than 0.1), which was consistent with the results of a full sample regression. 
Table 9. Board human capital and ambidextrous innovation: comparison by industry 
 
Exploitative Innovation Exploratory Innovation 
High-Tec
h 
Non-High-Te
ch 
High-Tec
h 
Non-High-T
ech 
High-Tech Non-High-Te
ch 
High-Tec
h 
Non-High-Te
ch 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
IOTTOU IOTTOU IOTTOU IOTTOU IOTTOE IOTTOE IOTTOE IOTTOE 
BHC 
0.0488 *** 0.0037   0.0561 ** 0.0602 ***   
(6.0162) (0.7488)   (2.1835) (3.8540)   
DEI 
  0.1885 *** 0.0013   0.0063 –0.0442 
  (5.6824) (0.0584)   (0.0733) (–0.9498) 
BAC 
  0.1122 –0.0391   0.4272 0.9535 *** 
  (1.3517) (–0.6882)   (1.5407) (5.3332) 
SEA 
  0.2880 ** 0.1105   0.7002 0.6125 ** 
  (2.1138) (1.1709)   (1.3006) (2.4582) 
SIZE 
0.0622 *** 0.0123 0.0616 *** 0.0116 –0.0116 –0.1149 *** –0.0152 –0.1082 *** 
(3.9690) (1.2978) (3.9107) (1.2317) (–0.2201) (–4.2676) (–0.2903) (–4.0869) 
DOU
L 
0.0587 * 0.0200 0.0597 * 0.0203 0.1067 –0.0302 0.1154 –0.0328 
(1.7202) (0.8059) (1.7523) (0.8250) (0.7690) (–0.3792) (0.8305) (–0.4068) 
SEC 
–0.9668 
*** 
–0.3766 *** –0.9515 
*** 
–0.3844 *** 0.8895* –1.1913 *** 0.9094* –1.1819 *** 
(–6.5658) (–5.3498) (–6.4862) (–5.3596) (1.7082) (–5.4530) (1.7451) (–5.4731) 
LEV 
0.0315 –0.0152 0.0119 –0.0128 –1.3002 *** –1.0036 *** –1.2503 
*** 
–1.0199 *** 
(0.3479) (–0.1868) (0.1310) (–0.1579) (–3.8993) (–6.0451) (–3.6844) (–6.2126) 
AGE 
–0.0594 –0.0408 –0.0640 –0.0472 –0.5348 *** –0.3876 *** –0.5181 
*** 
–0.3510 *** 
(–1.1558) (–1.1766) (–1.2546) (–1.2962) (–2.8675) (–4.4922) (–2.7502) (–4.1371) 
STA 
–0.0059 0.0214 –0.0263 0.0250 –0.4825 *** 0.0632 –0.4761 
*** 
0.0796 
(–0.1624) (0.8526) (–0.7009) (0.9828) (–4.2808) (0.7916) (–4.1612) (1.0212) 
GDP 
0.7680 ** 0.1752 0.7774 ** 0.1751 –2.0315 2.5378 *** –2.0100 2.4762 *** 
(2.2039) (0.7362) (2.2285) (0.7387) (–1.2352) (3.3826) (–1.2151) (3.3684) 
Year/ 
IND 
Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
_cons 
–0.3482 0.4855* –0.8346 ** 0.5114* 3.1667 ** 2.3886 *** 2.9963 ** 2.1260 *** 
(–0.8444) (1.8468) (–1.9911) (1.9039) (2.3974) (3.9986) (2.2481) (3.6125) 
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N 3270 2526 3270 2526 1237 1586 1237 1586 
r2_a 0.1739 0.0363 0.1762 0.0362 0.1739 0.2164 0.1731 0.2281 
F 20.9973 3.9760 31.3923 3.7924 13.3909 14.6756 12.2501 14.7746 
P1 0.0000 – 0.8900 – 
P2 – 0.0000 – 0.6008 
P3 – 0.1308 – 0.1071 
P4  0.2821  0.8813 
Note: (1) *, **, and *** represent the significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. (2) The 
values in parentheses are the t-statistics after the heteroscedasticity was corrected. (3) We apply 
suest to test the difference between the coefficients of the group. Among them, the empirical values 
P1, P2, P3, and P4 were used to test the difference between BHC, DEI, BAC, and SEA coefficients 
between groups. 
Board Human Capital and Ambidextrous Innovation: Comparison by Market Strength. The degree of 
market competition was measured using the Herfindahl index (HHI) of operating income, which is 
calculated using the formula: 𝐻𝐻𝐼 = ∑ 𝑋௜ଶ , where i represents the industry, 𝑋௜  represents the 
proportion of market competitors in the industry of i in the total market share, which is measured 
using the proportion of each enterprise in the total annual sales of industry i. 
We compared the difference between board human capital and exploitative innovation 
according to the strength of market competition. The regression results in columns (1) and (2) of 
Table 10 show that, consistent with the results of a full sample regression, the estimated coefficient of 
board human capital was significantly positive no matter whether the market competitiveness was 
strong or weak (t = 2.5299, p < 0.05; t = 4.8353, p < 0.01). The results show that the promotion effect of 
board human capital on exploitative innovation was not affected by market competition (the 
empirical value P1 corresponding to columns (1) and (2) in Table 10 was greater than 0.1). Therefore, 
no matter how competitive the market is, enterprises should attach importance to the value of board 
human capital in improving exploitative innovation. Further, the regression results in columns (3) 
and (4) of Table 10 show that, consistent with the results of the whole sample regression, for 
enterprises in different market competition environments, there was a significantly positive 
correlation between a board’s education level and exploitative innovation (t = 2.0260, p < 0.05; t = 
3.6458, p < 0.01), and there was no significant difference in either coefficient or correlation, indicating 
the importance of a board’s education level for exploitative innovation. Consistent with the results of 
the full sample regression, a board’s professional background was not affected by the strength of 
market competitiveness and had no significant correlation with exploitative innovation. When the 
market competition was weak, the estimated coefficient of a board’s overseas experience was 
significantly positive (t = 2.0524, p < 0.05). On the contrary, when the market competition was strong, 
the estimated coefficient was not significant. Further the inter-group coefficient difference test 
results show that there was no significant difference in the grouping regression (the empirical value 
P4 corresponding to columns (3) and (4) in Table 10 was greater than 0.1). It can be seen that 
improving a board’s overseas experience had a positive significance for promoting the exploitative 
innovation of enterprises. 
The regression results in columns (5) and (6) of Table 10 show that when the market 
competition was weak, the estimated coefficient of board human capital was significantly positive (t 
= 5.4551, p < 0.01). On the contrary, when the market competitiveness was strong, the estimated 
coefficient was not significant (t = 0.1006, p > 0.1). The inter-group coefficient test further verified the 
above results (the empirical value P1 corresponding to columns (5) and (6) in Table 10 was less than 
0.1). When the market competition was weak, board human capital played a stronger role in 
promoting exploratory innovation. The reason for this may have been that for enterprises to achieve 
a technological breakthrough, they often need to have certain oligopolistic market power to 
guarantee all the resources for research and development. If the market competition is weaker, the 
market concentration would be higher. In industries with high market concentration, there are often 
oligopolies or monopolies, and the market power of these large enterprises can ensure that they have 
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enough R&D investment. In this case, board human capital is more likely to play a role in creating an 
advantage in raising resources for exploratory innovation. 
Further, the regression results in columns (7) and (8) of Table 10 are observed: when the market 
competition was strong, the estimated coefficient of a board’s education level was significantly 
negative (t = −2.0224, p < 0.05). In contrast, when the market competitiveness was weak, the 
estimated coefficient was not significant (t = 1.0190, p > 0.1). Furthermore, the inter-group coefficient 
difference test shows that there were significant differences in the relationship between a board’s 
education level and exploratory innovation in different market competition environments (the 
empirical value P2 corresponding to columns (7) and (8) in Table 10 was greater than 0.1). It can be 
seen that the influence of a board’s education level on exploratory innovation was greatly influenced 
by the strength or weakness of industry competition, and the two influence directions were 
different, which may be the reason why the results in the full sample regression were not significant. 
Consistent with the results of a full sample regression, the estimated coefficient of a board’s 
professional background (BAC) was significantly positive, regardless of the strength of market 
competition (t = 2.4699, p < 0.05; t = 3.2090, p < 0.01). In order to prevent estimation errors, we further 
tested the coefficient differences between groups and the results show that there was no significant 
difference (the empirical value P3 corresponding to columns (7) and (8) in Table 10 was greater than 
0.1), where the promotion effect of a board’s professional background was not affected by the 
market competition. When the market competition was weak, the estimated coefficient of a board’s 
overseas experience was significantly positive (t = 3.8818, p < 0.01), but when the market competition 
was strong, the estimated coefficient was not significant. The inter-group coefficient difference test 
further confirmed the above conclusion (the empirical value P1 corresponding to columns (5) and (6) 
in Table 10 was less than 0.1). When the market competitiveness was weak, the promotion effect was 
more significant, indicating that in large enterprises with a high market concentration, it was easier 
to develop the promotion effect of a board’s overseas experience on the exploratory innovation of 
enterprises. 
Table 10. Board human capital and ambidextrous innovation: comparison by market strength 
 
Exploitative Innovation Exploratory Innovation 
Strong Weak Strong Weak Strong Weak Strong Weak 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
IOTTOU IOTTOU IOTTOU IOTTOU IOTTOE IOTTOE IOTTOE IOTTOE 
BHC 
0.0235 ** 0.0284 ***   0.0022 0.0967 ***   
(2.5299) (4.8353)   (0.1006) (5.4551)   
DEI 
  0.0835 ** 0.0890 ***   –0.1642 ** 0.0628 
  (2.0260) (3.6458)   (–2.0224) (1.0190) 
BAC 
  –0.0551 0.0800   0.6877 ** 0.6051 *** 
  (–0.5488) (1.3025)   (2.4699) (3.2090) 
SEA 
  0.2311 0.2064 **   0.0835 1.3392 *** 
  (1.5750) (2.0524)   (0.2094) (3.8818) 
SIZE 
0.0500 *** 0.0472 *** 0.0478 ** 0.0463 *** –0.0756* –0.0538 –0.0793* –0.0545 
(2.6075) (3.8073) (2.4838) (3.7090) (–1.7012) (–1.5446) (–1.7698) (–1.5525) 
DOUL 
0.0677* 0.0258 0.0680* 0.0257 0.2695 ** –0.0643 0.2988 ** –0.0569 
(1.7040) (0.9938) (1.7127) (0.9894) (2.1255) (–0.6560) (2.3602) (–0.5789) 
SEC 
–0.7740 *** –0.6471 *** –0.7799 *** –0.6414 *** –0.7688 ** 0.0704 –0.6360 0.0550 
(–4.2117) (–5.7326) (–4.2444) (–5.6809) (–1.9671) (0.2140) (–1.6227) (0.1674) 
LEV 
–0.1276 0.0390 –0.1327 0.0335 –0.7877 *** –1.2913 *** –0.7382 ** –1.2670 *** 
(–1.1009) (0.5498) (–1.1441) (0.4709) (–2.7487) (–6.1034) (–2.5792) (–5.9787) 
AGE 
–0.0063 –0.0772 ** –0.0169 –0.0787 ** –0.4752 *** –0.3884 *** –0.4168 *** –0.3742 *** 
(–0.1157) (–2.0650) (–0.3086) (–2.0969) (–3.2446) (–2.7677) (–2.8081) (–2.6642) 
STA 
–0.0402 0.0405 –0.0372 0.0316 0.0436 –0.3757 *** –0.0016 –0.3468 *** 
(–0.7801) (1.4920) (–0.7087) (1.1384) (0.4169) (–4.7476) (–0.0152) (–4.3046) 
GDP 
0.5904 0.4010 0.5625 0.4166 0.3372 0.6940 0.6867 0.5884 
(1.0841) (1.2937) (1.0328) (1.3441) (0.2640) (0.6698) (0.5376) (0.5674) 
Year/ 
IND 
Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
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_cons 
–0.6196 0.0472 –0.7358 –0.1862 3.4214 ** 2.6016 ** 3.7364 ** 2.2497 ** 
(–0.6896) (0.1546) (–0.8139) (–0.5989) (2.0565) (2.4601) (2.2513) (2.1194) 
N 1948 3848 1948 3848 781 2042 781 2042 
r2_a 0.1445 0.2242 0.1450 0.2246 0.3147 0.3365 0.3213 0.3371 
F 9.8888 31.0428 9.4646 29.5790 11.5360 28.9761 11.2586 27.6174 
P1 0.6589 – 0.0005 – 
P2 – 0.9073 – 0.0176 
P3 – 0.2669 – 0.8047 
P4  0.8969  0.0117 
Note: (1) *, **, and *** represent the significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. (2) The 
values in parentheses are the t-statistics after the heteroscedasticity was corrected. (3) We apply suest 
to test the difference between the coefficients of the group. Among them, the empirical values P1, P2, 
P3, and P4 were used to test the difference between BHC, DEI, BAC, and SEA coefficients between 
groups. 
6. Conclusion and Discussion 
6.1. Conclusion 
In this paper, we show clear empirical evidence that board human capital had a significantly 
favorable impact on enterprise growth, and ambidextrous innovation played as role as part of the 
intermediary role. Further analysis shows that a board’s education level had a significant positive 
impact on enterprise growth, in which exploitative innovation played as role as part of the 
mediating effect. The research of Wincent et al. [52] shows that heterogeneity of a board’s 
knowledge and skill is particularly important for incremental innovation, while a board’s education 
level is particularly important for radical innovation. However, this paper finds that a board’s 
education level had a significant role in promoting exploitative innovation, but there was no 
significant correlation with exploratory innovation, which may be related to the strong awareness of 
risk aversion of highly educated directors. Although the board of directors with a high degree of 
education attached more importance to the investment in enterprise research and development, the 
board of directors faced great pressure from inside and outside the enterprise when making 
decisions on enterprise innovation because radical innovation usually means a higher risk and a 
longer return period. Meanwhile, directors with higher education levels were usually more rational. 
As a result, they were part of the enterprise project engaging in high risk prevention.  
Existing studies have suggested that decision-makers with R&D, marketing, and design 
experience pay more attention to the technological development of enterprises and tend to increase 
input in product and technological innovation [53]. The proportion of directors with an "output 
function" background was negatively correlated with enterprise growth, which may have been 
related to the directors with this background lacking professional management knowledge and 
experience, and the strategic decision-making having a risk preference. When studying the 
relationship between a board’s professional background and ambidextrous innovation, it was found 
that there was no significant correlation between a board’s professional background and exploitative 
innovation; but there was a significantly positive correlation with exploratory innovation. A board’s 
overseas experience was positively correlated with enterprise growth, among which ambidextrous 
innovation played a partly mediating role. Therefore, a board’s overseas experience can significantly 
influence enterprise growth through exploitative innovation and exploratory innovation. 
The balance effect between exploitative innovation and exploratory innovation can enhance 
enterprise growth to a certain extent. The balance effect between exploitative innovation and 
exploratory innovation can prevent the dangers of a "core rigidity" and an "innovation trap" caused 
by excessive emphasis on one party, which is conducive to reducing business risks, ensuring the 
improvement of short-term financial performance and the construction of a sustainable 
competitiveness of enterprises to significantly improve enterprise growth. 
The difference analysis of the influencing factors of enterprise growth shows that board human 
capital played a more significant role in promoting enterprise growth in the high-tech industry. 
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There were significant industry differences in the role of ambidextrous innovation in promoting 
enterprise growth. Among them, the promoting effect of exploitative innovation on enterprise 
growth was more significant in non-high-tech industries; while the promoting effect of exploratory 
innovation on enterprise growth was more significant in high-tech industries. This paper shows that 
ambidextrous innovation played an irreplaceable role in promoting enterprise growth. Due to the 
low level of innovation in various industries at present, the development of ambidextrous 
innovation was extremely unbalanced. In particular, non-high-tech industries relied too much on 
exploitative innovation and exploratory innovation had not been developed into an important 
driving force to promote enterprise growth. 
The difference analysis of the influence factors of ambidextrous innovation shows that board 
human capital had a significant industrial difference in the promotion of exploitative innovation, 
which was stronger in the high-tech industry; meanwhile, there was no significant industrial 
difference in the promotion of exploratory innovation. Arrow [54] believes that a competitive market 
is more likely to stimulate enterprise innovation, while this study finds that board human capital 
played an important role in promoting exploitative innovation, which was not affected by the degree 
of market competition. The research on exploratory innovation supports Schumpeter's hypothesis 
that there is a positive correlation between technological innovation and market concentration. It 
shows that in the environment of high market concentration and weak market competition, some 
enterprises often have certain market dominance, which ensures that enterprises have sufficient 
investment in innovation and R&D, and board human capital is more likely to play a role as an 
exploratory innovation advantage resource for enterprises. Moreover, although listed enterprises in 
China have the same level of board human capital, their promotion of ambidextrous innovation will 
be significantly different due to the influence of industry differences and market competition. 
6.2. Contribution 
This paper contributes to relevant research in a couple of ways. First, we introduce 
ambidextrous innovation as a mediator from the perspective of “enterprise resources—enterprise 
capability—enterprise growth,” explain the impact of board human capital on enterprise growth 
from internal and external factors and reveal the favorable role of board human capital in the process 
of enterprise growth. Second, the leading antecedent variable was an important research direction of 
the antecedent variable of ambidextrous innovation organization. The existing research mainly 
focuses on the "leadership duality" characteristics at the individual level, while the research on the 
"top management team duality" characteristics at the organizational level is in the initial stage. We 
enrich the related research on characteristics regarding “top management team duality” by 
exploring the impact of board human capital on ambidextrous innovation. Third, based on the 
research of the endogenous perspective of enterprise growth, we focused on the impact of 
environmental factors at the industry level. By grouping enterprises according to the nature of the 
industry and the intensity of market competition, we revealed the differences in the influence of 
board human capital on ambidextrous innovation and enterprise growth. There was a guiding 
significance for enterprises in different industries to build a sustainable competitive advantage. 
6.3. Practical Implications 
At present, emerging production factors, such as technology and knowledge, should gradually 
become the main driving force for enterprise growth [42]. In order to improve the level and quality 
of enterprise innovation and promote the healthy and sustainable development of enterprises, it is 
necessary to establish the coordination mechanism between the government and enterprises. Based 
on the research conclusions, the following countermeasures are proposed. 
First, listed companies should fully recognize the favorable role of board human capital. By 
optimizing the composition of the board of directors and improving the level of board human 
capital, enterprises can build a sustainable competitive advantage. Directors with a higher 
educational level, professional management knowledge, and overseas background can significantly 
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improve enterprise growth, which should be taken as an important basis for the selection and 
recruitment of directors. Furthermore, the human capital level of existing directors can be constantly 
optimized through self-development and management development. Enterprises can also choose to 
set up practical training classes for senior managers, along with other ways, to help directors achieve 
a breakthrough in ideas and improve their management ability. In addition, enterprises should build 
cooperation platforms with overseas universities and research institutes, and constantly introduce 
advanced management knowledge and experience. Directors without overseas background in an 
enterprise can continuously expand their international vision and management experience through 
overseas study or dispatch. 
Second, the relative balance between exploitative innovation and exploratory innovation 
should be highly valued in the process of enterprise development. Since the reform and opening up 
policy was implemented, China has gradually established a modern technology system and 
narrowed the gap with the world's advanced technology by means of “introduction, digestion, 
absorption and re-innovation.” China has made great progress in the exploitative innovation level, 
and promoted the rapid and efficient development of its economy. However, as China's economy 
enters a higher stage of development, the existing knowledge and technical level can no longer meet 
the needs of economic development due to various contradictions. Enterprises will rely on original 
innovation if they want to compete in the international market. In order to become a supporting 
force for enterprise growth in non-high-tech industries, the development and cultivation of 
exploratory innovation ability should have great importance attached to it. 
Third, listed companies should formulate innovative strategies in line with the current stage of 
development, according to the nature of the industry and the market competition environment. 
Different industries have different demands and focus on innovation, so different innovation 
strategies are formed based on different considerations, such as organizational culture [55]. At 
present, the high-tech industry focuses on exploratory innovation; meanwhile, the non-high-tech 
industry prefers exploitative innovation. Therefore, in the process of enterprise innovation, on the 
one hand, enterprises should be committed to the pursuit of ambidextrous innovation and 
enterprises should pay attention to the balanced development of exploitative innovation and 
exploratory innovation in the process of development, rather than relying too much on a certain type 
of innovation. On the other hand, enterprises should pursue substantial innovation and constantly 
improve the level and quality of innovation to avoid the waste of innovation resources. In addition, 
enterprises should have a correct understanding of the significance of industry competition to 
enhance their sustainable competitive advantage as a source of power.  
6.4. Limitations and Future Research 
There are still some imperfections in this study. We only selected board’s education level, 
professional background, and overseas experience to measure board human capital. Although these 
dimensions have important considerations in enterprise recruitment and career promotion, they are 
not sufficient to comprehensively capture board human capital, which needs to be further 
supplemented in subsequent studies. We do not consider the important role played by board social 
capital in promoting enterprise growth. The existing research suggests that board human capital and 
board social capital are interdependent and inseparable, which together constitute board capital [56]. 
Therefore, the relationship between board social capital and enterprise growth and ambidextrous 
innovation should be considered in the future research. 
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